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AGGRESSIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW, POLITICAL
IDEOLOGY, AND THE RULE OF LAW

1. INTRODUCTION
One of America’s greatest Founding Fathers, Alexander Hamilton, explained
in the Federalist Papers why the American constitutional system requires judges
to play an important role in our system of checks and balances and separation
of powers. After discussing the importance of an independent judiciary, he said
the following in Federalist No. 78:
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain
specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall
pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this
kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts
of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor
of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing1.

Similarly, in 1803, Chief Justice John Marshall, in the landmark case Marbury
v. Madison2, after noting that the United States Constitution is the Supreme Law
of the land, observed that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is”3. According to both men, laws that are
inconsistent with the Constitution have no legal effect, and judges must declare
such legislation null and void. The point of a written Constitution is to limit what
future government actors may do, and the only effective way to keep leaders
within the scope of their constitutional authority is to authorize judges to enforce
those limitations.
A. Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78, “Independent Journal” 1788.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
3
Ibidem at 177.
1
2
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There is little doubt that constitutional limitations would be ineffective, and
the separation of powers harder to enforce, without some government institution separate from the legislature and the executive having the authority to decide
when those two branches of government have exceeded their authority. One issue
left unresolved by the Founding Fathers of American democracy, however, was
how to limit the authority of judges. Judicial review makes sense when constitutional limitations are clear, such as with the requirements that in the United
States the President must by thirty-five or there must be two Senators from every
state. But many of the United States Constitution’s most important provisions, and
the ones that are most often litigated, involve vague commands such as the government may not abridge the freedom of speech, establish a religion, or deny
to the people the equal protection of the laws or due process of law. These directives are anything but self-defining and have led to judicial resolution of some
of the most difficult social, political, and legal issues faced by the American people.
Abortion, affirmative action, and campaign finance reform are just three issues
that the United States Supreme Court has largely taken away from the American
people. It is questionable at best whether the Founding Fathers wanted judges
to play that major a role in American politics.
This paper focuses on what should be the appropriate role of life-tenured, unelected federal judges in the American system of separation of powers. The tension
is between needing judges to enforce the supreme law of the Constitution while
at the same time keeping judges within their assigned roles of enforcing not making the law. Much of constitutional scholarship in the United States is devoted
to resolving this tension. The thesis of this paper is that, absent much needed
structural reform, which is most unlikely to occur, only a clear error rule, where
judges don’t strike down laws unless the inconsistency between the statute and
the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable dispute, can both allow judges to limit
elected leaders to their constitutional responsibilities but also not transfer too
much power to government officials who the people do not elect and who hold
their positions for life.
1.1. THE CYCLES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

The Supreme Court has played many different political roles over the course
of American history. In 1857, with the country torn apart by the issue of slavery,
the Justices decided to enter this dangerous thicket. In the infamous Dred Scott
case4, the Court ruled that African-Americans were not and could not be citizens
of the United States, and Congress did not have the authority to prohibit slavery in
the new American territories. This decision, which many scholars believe moved
4

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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the United States much closer to civil war5, was based on questionable interpretations of text and history. More likely, the Justices in the majority thought that they
could bring this controversial issue to a close. Ideology not law was the true basis
for the holding, and that pattern continues to this very day.
From 1900-1936, the Supreme Court of the United States invalidated over
200 laws pertaining to workplace issues such as minimum wages, overtime rules,
employee safety, and child labor6. This time period, often referred to by legal
scholars as the Lochner era, was based on the Justices’ emphasis on a laissez faire
economic philosophy not any clear constitutional text, obvious history, or even
prior case law. The Justices’ improper meddling into economic issues eventually
led to President Roosevelt’s infamous “court packing” plan and possibly a political metamorphosis by Justice Owen Roberts which became known as the “shift
in time that saved nine”7. Whether or not the political pressure of the plan led
to Roberts’ shift, eventually new Justices appointed by Roosevelt overturned
much of the Lochner era case law not because they discovered new constitutional
evidence but because they held substantially different political views.
Beginning in the early 1960’s, the Warren Court (and later the early Burger
Court) unleashed a torrent of important personal rights decisions which dramatically altered the American political landscape. The Court promulgated constitutional rules regarding voting rights, defamation, abortion, free speech, the free
exercise of religion and a series of cases protecting the rights of criminal defendants and limiting police practices. This era didn’t last long but it did fundamentally alter America’s constitutional landscape8.
What is perhaps most interesting about these decisions is that in many of them
the Court did not try hard to justify overturning longstanding state and federal
laws through a careful review of constitutional text and history or even prior
Supreme Court decisions. For example, Justice Douglas’ plurality opinion in
the landmark case Griswold v. Connecticut striking down a state ban on contraceptive use, and finding a constitutional right to privacy that would later be used
by the Court in Roe v. Wade, is only six pages long9. Similarly, the Court’s opinion in Brandenburg v. Ohio, which set forth the fundamental test for determining whether inflammatory speech (in that case, racist epithets) is constitutionally
protected is only five pages long without any mention of the First Amendment’s
original meaning10. For more than a decade, the Court issued major constitutional
5
See P. Finkelman, S. V. Sandford, The Court’s Most Dreadful Case and How It Changed
History, ”Chicago-Kent Law Review” 2007, Vol. 82, No. 3.
6
See S. A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition,
“North Carolina Law Review” 1991, Vol. 70.
7
See https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/west-coast-hotels-place- in-american-constitutional-history (visited February 25, 2019).
8
See E. Segall, Originalism as Faith, New York 2018.
9
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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decisions with “no coherent jurisprudence ‘apart from the results reached’”11.
The Justices were much more concerned with their own ideological notions
of fairness, justice, and equality, than legal reasoning, just as was true during
the Lochner era, albeit with substantially different values at play.
There was a major backlash to the Warren Court’s liberal decisions among
scholars, judges, and politicians. Although this criticism often came in the form
of accusing the Court of not focusing on the “original intent” or “original meaning” of the Constitution12, the true source of the critic’s displeasure was ideological and political disagreement with the results reached by the Court. This
disconnect became obvious when, after twelve years of federal court judges and
Supreme Court Justices appointed by Republican Presidents Ronald Reagan and
George H.W. Bush, a new conservative Supreme Court also paid little attention
to text and history while aggressively striking down laws based on a different
set of values. Starting around 1995, the Court strongly favored states rights, limited or reversed many Warren Court precedents protecting defendants’ rights,
applied strict scrutiny to affirmative action, used the first amendment to overturn commercial speech laws, cut back on voting rights, and maybe most importantly overturned a series of campaign finance reform laws13. Again, what was
at play in these cases was values and politics, not prior positive law, such as text
and history.
The history of the Supreme Court of the United States can be divided into
different eras of judicial review depending on the political make-up of the Court.
As I’ve written elsewhere, in virtually every area of litigated constitutional law,
the relevant legal doctrine has changed dramatically over the years while the text
and history of the Constitution has stayed the same14. Given the open-ended
nature of most litigated constitutional text, the reasonable debates over the Constitution’s original meaning, and the Supreme Court’s discretion to reverse its
own decisions whenever it feels doing so is necessary, it is not surprising that
the Court’s decisions reflect the Justices’ personal and political values much more
than prior positive law.

11
J. O’Neil, Originalism in American Law and Politics, The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2005 (quoting L. A. Powe Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics, Cambridge 2000,
pp. 214-215).
12
See R. H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, ”Indiana Law
Journal” 1971, Vol. 47, No. 1.
13
See M. A. Graber, Does It Really Matter? Conservative Courts in a Conservative Era,
“Fordham Law Review” 2006, Vol. 75, pp. 675-708.
14
See E. J. Segall, Constitutional Change and The Supreme Court: The Article V Problem,
”The University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law” 2013, Vol. 16.
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1.2. HOW TO LIMIT THE JUSTICES’ OVERSIZED POWER
AND INFLUENCE

American law reviews and scholarly books discussing the Supreme Court
are full of theoretical models designed to limit the power of the Justices. These
efforts to devise theoretical or intellectual pre-commitments to cabin the judicial
discretion of the Justices have so far been wholly unsuccessful. As most political
scientists agree, the Justices decide hard constitutional cases based on their own
politics, values and life experiences, not prior legal rules15.
One way to weaken the Court and make it more responsive to the law would be
to reform how the Court operates. In the wake of the confirmation of Justice Brett
Kavanaugh, giving conservatives a solid five vote majority on the Court, many
liberal law professors in the United States have set forth proposals to restructure
the Court. These suggestions include ending life tenure16, requiring a super-majority vote to overturn laws17, and even stripping the Court of jurisdiction over
various controversial areas of constitutional law18.
Weakening the Court just because of its current political make-up is wrongheaded. The United States should restructure the Supreme Court not because it is
too conservative, too liberal, or even too moderate. The Court simply wields far
too much power and influence regardless of which political side benefits from its
decisions19. Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely that any of these reforms will ever
take place.
Another method of limiting the Court’s power would be for the Justices
to return to the original rationale for judicial review which included a strong presumption in favor of legislation. In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton, in
response to concerns by people opposed to the very idea of judicial review, said
that the Court would only overturn laws when there is in “irreconcilable variance”
between the challenged statute and the Constitution20. Additionally, early state
and federal cases suggest strongly that, unless the judiciary’s power was directly
at stake, such as with jury or evidentiary issues, the Founding Fathers expected
judges to only interfere with the decisions of more accountable governmental

See H. J. Spaeth, J. A. Segall, Majority Rule or Minority Will: Adherence to Precedent on
the U.S. Supreme Court, New York 1999.
16
See https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/opinion/columnists/brett-kavanaugh-supremecourt-term-limits.html (visited February 26, 2019).
17
See https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2018/10/recusal-practice-in-the-supremecourt.html (visited February 26, 2019).
18
See https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/supreme-court-kavanaugh-gorsuch_us_ 5bf806e3e4b0771fb6b8489a (visited February 26, 2019).
19
See https://www.salon.com/2018/12/04/its-time-to-reform-the-supreme-court-but-not-forthe-wrong-reasons/ (visited February 26, 2019).
20
A. Hamilton, The Federalist…
15
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officials in cases where the constitutional violation amounted to clear error21.
The men who wrote and ratified the Constitution never intended the Supreme
Court to play the role of the ultimate guardian of the country’s moral choices
on issues where the Constitution does not speak clearly. Where reasonable people can disagree over the constitutional validity of laws voted on by the people’s
representatives, the Constitution’s original meaning dictated that judges stay out
of the political thicket22. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has for over a century
played a much different and more active role in America’s politics.
As I’ve written elsewhere, over the last century or so, the Court has imposed
its will on a plethora of difficult policy decisions even though text and history did
not clearly call for the Court to strike down the legislation. The Court at one time
or another has “invalidated laws pertaining to minimum wages, overtime rules,
child labor, abortion, affirmative action, campaign finance reform, gay rights/
same-sex marriage, how states carve up voting districts, pure commercial speech,
aid to religious schools, religious symbols on government property, and speech
rules in schools and government offices”23.
The problems with unelected, life-tenured judges having so much authority
to dictate answers to these kinds of questions are well-documented. Replacing
political debate and legislative efforts to achieve consensus with judicial edicts
from nine judges in the nation’s Capitol makes it harder to achieve compromise
among warring sides and elevates the Supreme Court nomination process to an
importance that affects elections and distorts normal politics. Justice Antonin
Scalia, who throughout his career voted to overturn law after law even where
text and history did not justify those results24, nevertheless described accurately
the problems with the Court’s overly aggressive acts of judicial review:
As long as this Court thought (and the people thought) that we Justices were doing
essentially lawyers’ work up here – reading text and discerning our society’s traditional understanding of that text – the public pretty much left us alone. Texts and traditions are facts to study, not convictions to demonstrate about. But if in reality our
process of constitutional adjudication consists primarily of making value judgments,
then a free and intelligent people’s attitude towards us can be expected to be (ought
to be) quite different. The people know that their value judgments are quite as good
as those taught in any law school – maybe better. If, indeed, the “liberties” protected
by the Constitution are, as the Court says, undefined and unbounded, then the people
should demonstrate, to protest that we do not implement their values instead of ours.
Not only that, but confirmation hearings for new Justices should deteriorate into quSee E. Segall, Originalism as Faith…, pp. 15-25.
See E. Segall, Judicial Engagement, New Originalism, and the Fortieth Anniversary of
Government by Judiciary, “Fordham Law Review Online” 2017, Vol. 86.
23
See https://www.salon.com/2018/12/04/its-time-to-reform-the-supreme-court-but-not-forthe-wrong-reasons/ (visited February 26, 2019).
24
See E. J. Segall, The Constitution According to Justices Scalia and Thomas: Alive and
Kickin’, “Washington University Law Review” 2014, Vol. 91.
21

22
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estion and answer sessions in which Senators go through a list of their constituents’
most favored and most disfavored alleged constitutional rights, and seek the nominee’s commitment to support or oppose them. Value judgments, after all, should be
voted on, not dictated 25.

It is not impossible to imagine a system or tradition of judicial review wherein
the Supreme Court does not invalidate laws absent clear and convincing evidence
that the challenged statute violates the Untied States Constitution. Since 1936,
the Justices have applied a highly deferential rational basis test to run-of-the-mill
economic legislation that did not implicate other textual constitutional limitations. Although some argue that this test may be too deferential and amounts
to an automatic rubber-stamping of state and federal laws26, this model of decision-making applied to the entire Constitution, perhaps strengthened just a bit,
would take the Court out of normal politics and return it to the role envisioned
by the founding fathers as a bulwark against only clear constitutional violations.
Similarly, when federal appellate judges review the factual findings of lower
courts, they are only allowed to review such findings under a “clearly erroneous”
standard of review27. This standard works well in practice and leads to very few
trial court factual conclusions being overturned on appeal by appellate judges.
Of course, no legal standard can guard against bad-faith judging but an assumption of good faith is implicit in any democratic legal system. This kind of clearly
erroneous standard applied to the validity of state and federal laws would still deter
obvious constitutional violations but would substantially decrease the Court’s ability to invalidate laws they do not like when their only basis for doing so is political
disagreement with other more accountable governmental officials.
The political nature of the Court’s present decision-making process is taking
a serious toll on the American political system. Exit polls taken after the 2016
Presidential election showed that “seven in 10 voters nationwide say Supreme
Court appointments were either the most important factor or an important factor
in their decision to support a candidate”28. Additionally, 21% of voters said that
the future of the Supreme Court was the reason they voted for one candidate or
the other, and 57% of those voters preferred Donald Trump (even though Trump
lost the popular vote)29. Elections should be about economics, foreign policy,
social and cultural issues, and leadership, not nine unelected, life-tenured judges.
The reality, however, is that the American people know that the Supreme Court
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See C. Neily, No More Make-Believe Judging, “George Mason Law Review” 2012, Vol. 19.
27
See K. Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, “Seattle University Law
Review” 1994, Vol. 18.
28
https://www.nbcnews.com/card/nbc-news-exit-poll-future-supreme-court-appointmentsimportant-factor-n680381 (visited February 27, 2019).
29
https://www.vox.com/2018/6/29/17511088/scotus-2016-election-poll-trump-republicanskennedy-retire (visited February 27, 2019).
25
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will have the final say over the kinds of issues elections should be fought over
even when the Constitution does not favor one resolution or another concerning
those issues. That document is silent about abortion, affirmative action, campaign
spending by big corporations and many other issues the Court has taken away
from more democratic political processes. A more deferential standard of review
is sorely needed to return the Court to its proper place of enforcing the Constitution’s real limits on governmental power not the imaginary and largely unwritten
Constitution that authorizes the Court to resolve many of America’s most important and controversial public policy questions based on politics and personal values not constitutional text and history.

2. CONCLUSIONS
The Supreme Court of the United States is by far the most powerful judicial
institution in the free world. The Justices of that Court are the only high court
judges in any Democracy to have life tenure. The Justices for the most part select
their own cases and define their own workload. And, they are currently part of a
long tradition of overturning state and federal laws even when the alleged constitutional violation is far from clear. The combination of all these factors has
led to a political system where judges play too important a role in the resolution
of controversial and important policy issues. It is one thing for judges to overturn laws clearly in conflict with written constitutional limitations on government
behavior. It is quite another thing, however, for judges to invalidate the decisions
of elected and more accountable government officials and voters based on the personal values, politics, and experiences of the judges, not the rule of law.
There are two possible ways to limit the damage caused by an overly aggressive Court. One is to put in place structural reforms to weaken the institution
itself. Most of the recent suggested reforms, however, such as imposing term limits, or requiring two-thirds of the Justices to agree before a law would be struck
down, would likely take a constitutional amendment which in the United States
requires a super-majority of both Congress and the states and is therefore highly
unlikely to happen.
Another possible solution to the problem of judicial overreaching is to select
more deferential judges or perhaps even by political protest or even an unwillingness on the part of politicians or the people to obey Supreme Court decisions.
The mere threat of the latter might just encourage the former. If something does
not encourage more humble, modest, and deferential judicial review in the near
future, the United States may well find itself in the midst of a constitutional crisis.
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Summary

For over one-hundred and fifty years, the United States Supreme Court has been
the most powerful judicial body in the world with life-tenured judges consistently
invalidating state and federal laws without clear support in constitutional text or history.
This paper focuses on what should be the appropriate role of life-tenured, unelected
federal judges in the American system of separation of powers. The tension is between
wanting judges to enforce the supreme law of the Constitution while at the same time
keeping judges within their assigned roles of enforcing not making the law. Much
of constitutional scholarship in the United States is devoted to resolving this tension.
This article argues that the Court should take a set back and defer more to elected leaders
and voters. Although structural reform might help, most needed changes would require
a constitutional amendment and are therefore unlikely to occur. The Justices should take
it upon themselves to act with more humility and modesty and only overturn laws where
there is strong evidence of clear constitutional error.
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Streszczenie

Od ponad stu pięćdziesięciu lat Sąd Najwyższy Stanów Zjednoczonych jest najpotężniejszym organem sądowniczym na świecie, złożonym z sędziów mianowanych na
całe życie, którzy są uprawnieni do tego, aby podważać przepisy stanowe i federalne bez
wyraźnego umocowania w tekście konstytucji lub w zwyczajach. Niniejszy artykuł koncentruje się na tym, jaka powinna być rola sędziów federalnych, nie pochodzących z wyborów. Autor argumentuje, że Sąd Najwyższy Stanów Zjednoczonych powinien zrobić
krok do tyłu i oprzeć się bardziej na wyborcach oraz liderach pochodzących z wyborów.
Mimo, że reforma strukturalna Sądu Najwyższego byłaby pomocna, to najbardziej potrzebne zmiany wymagałyby zmian tekstu konstytucji, a zatem są mało prawdopodobne
do przeprowadzenia. Sędziowie powinni podjąć działania z większą pokorą i skromnością, a prawo zmieniać jedynie tam, gdzie istnieją mocne dowody wyraźnego błędu
konstytucyjnego

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE

Sąd Najwyższy Stanów Zjednoczonych, prawo konstytucyjne, interpretacja
konstytucji

